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ABSTRACT
Healthcare costs are not only an enormous strain on the U.S.
economy but are expected to increase in the foreseeable future. Not
surprisingly, clever fraudsters view the healthcare industry as a
lucrative and attractive hotspot for illegal activity. Although federal
and state governments have increased their funding and prosecution efforts relating to healthcare fraud, this fraud continues to be a
major threat to the U.S. economy and every patient and consumer.
The impact of healthcare fraud is substantial and far-reaching.
Healthcare fraud in the U.S. affects not only the government, but
also insurance companies, patients, healthcare providers, and consumers. This Article examines the types of healthcare fraud and
the major federal laws used to combat this type of fraud.
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INTRODUCTION
Healthcare costs are a significant drain on the U.S. econAccording to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS), health expenditures in the U.S. are estimated to grow by
an average annual rate of 5.8 percent between 2015 and 2025
and are projected to reach $5.4 trillion in 2025, up from $3 trillion in 2014.2 In 2018, eighteen percent of the national economy
was spent on healthcare.3 It is no surprise that this large volume
of economic activity has led fraudsters to view healthcare as a
lucrative field for illegal activity.4 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) states that the costs associated with healthcare
fraud amount to tens of billions of dollars a year5 and are estimated to increase in the future as people live longer, which in
turn will increase the demand for Medicare benefits.6
The impact of healthcare fraud is significant and wide
reaching.7 The following parties may face the financial consequences: (1) insurance holders who pay higher premiums and outof-pocket expenses while receiving reduced benefits and coverage;
(2) businesses that pay increasing premiums to provide healthcare

omy.1

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2016), National Health Expenditures 2017 Highlights, https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and
-systems/statistics-trends-and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/downloads
/highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/AUX2-CNU9].
2 Id.
3 Peter G. Peterson Found., Key Drivers of the Debt, https://www.pgpf.org
/the-fiscal-and-economic-challenge/drivers [https://perma.cc/PTA5-5QR7].
4 See generally Consumer Info & Action, NAT’L HEALTHCARE ANTI-FRAUD
ASS’N (2016), https://www.nhcaa.org/resources/health-care-anti-fraud-resources
/consumer-info-action.aspx [https://perma.cc/K2L8-UNFB].
5 Rooting Out Healthcare Fraud is Central to the Well-Being of Both Our
Citizens and The Overall Economy (2016), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/white_collar/health-care-fraud [https://
perma.cc/QB3G-VHW9]. In fiscal year 2017, the Department of Justice recovered
$2.4 billion from healthcare fraud at the federal level. Justice Department Recovers Over $3.7 Billion From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2017, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-depart
ment-recovers-over-37-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2017 [https://
perma.cc/W75K-6WJ2].
6 Federal Crimes Report 2010–2011, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (2012),
https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/financial-crimes-report-2010-2011
[https://perma.cc/VP7Y-VR2X].
7 See NAT’L HEALTHCARE ANTI-FRAUD ASS’N, supra note 4.
1
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to their employees, resulting in an overall increased cost of doing
business; and (3) taxpayers who pay more to cover healthcare expenditures in public health plans.8 Beyond monetary damages,
healthcare fraud can also place patients at risk of serious physical
harm, unnecessary procedures, unapproved drugs, or overprescribed diagnostic tests and antibiotics.9 The vast amounts of
sensitive medical and financial information included in each patient’s medical records are an area also tempting to fraudsters.10
Due to troublesome increases in healthcare fraud, U.S.
federal and state law enforcement agencies have made healthcare
fraud prosecution a primary focus.11 Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) of 2010, for example, the
Obama Administration provided an additional $350 million for
healthcare fraud prevention and enforcement efforts.12
While the FBI is the primary investigative agency in the
fight against healthcare fraud, it coordinates its efforts with the
Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General
(HHS-OIG), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Criminal Investigation Division, and various state
and local agencies.13 However, despite more funding and a more
focused and integrative effort by multiple government entities in

Id.
Id.
10 See Health Care Fraud Unit, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice
.gov/criminal-fraud/health-care-fraud-unit [https://perma.cc/9XF6-RBYH].
11 Id. For example, Medicare Fraud Strike Forces have been in action for
over ten years. These Strike Forces are modeled on a cross-agency collaborative approach to investigations and resources, including a partnering of the FBI,
the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General
(HHS-OIG), the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Center for Program Integrity (CPI), U.S. Attorney’s offices, law enforcement agencies and
sometimes the Drug Enforcement Agency and Internal Revenue Service. See id.
12 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-48, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (amending various sections of the U.S. Code including the
False Claims Act and the Anti-Kickback statute); The Affordable Care Act
and Fighting Fraud (2016), U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., https://
www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/health-care-fraud-and-abuse-control-pro
gram-protects-consumers-and-taxpayers-combating-health-care [https://perma
.cc/98N9-AEUC].
13 Federal Crimes Report 2010–2011, supra note 6.
8
9
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the last few years, the threat of healthcare fraud remains high.14
This is evidenced by record-setting dollar amounts in recent healthcare fraud scheme takedowns, including opioid-related schemes.15
The goal of this analysis is to shed light on healthcare fraud
schemes as well as present solutions to help control it. An analysis of the scope of such fraud schemes highlights the importance
of effectively combating them. Educating the public is an important
step towards detecting and preventing this fraud in the first place.
This Article proceeds in two parts. In Part I, the scope of
healthcare fraud is introduced through the explanation of various schemes and review of recent cases. In Part II, major federal
civil and criminal laws and related regulations applicable to
healthcare fraud are analyzed.
I.TYPES OF HEALTHCARE FRAUD SCHEMES
The largest anti-healthcare fraud organization, the National
Health Care Anti-Fraud Association (“NHCAA”), defines healthcare fraud in general terms as an intentional deception or misrepresentation that could result in unauthorized benefit.16 There
are different types of healthcare fraud schemes that exist. While
the following discussion is not intended to be all-inclusive, it
highlights the most prevalent healthcare fraud schemes. These
include billing schemes, kickbacks, medical identity theft, fraud
against Medicare and Medicaid, hospital fraud, fraud by service
providers, and fraud by pharmaceutical companies.17
A.Billing Schemes
According to the NHCAA, most healthcare fraud is committed by organized criminals and the small minority of healthcare

See id.
On its website, the Department of Justice lists many of its charges, the
number of defendants, and the amount of falsely billed healthcare claims. Many
of the recent cases involved pharmacies, drug diversion, and controlled substances. Largest Health Care Fraud Enforcement Action in Department of Justice
History Resulted in 76 Doctors Charged and 84 Opioid Cases Involving More
Than 13 Million Illegal Dosages of Opioids, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (2018), https://
www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/health-care-fraud-unit/june-2015-takedown
[https://perma.cc/LXR7-C6KH].
16 NAT’L HEALTHCARE ANTI-FRAUD ASS’N, supra note 4.
17 Id.
14
15
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providers that are dishonest.18 Common examples of billing
fraud include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

billing for services or equipment not rendered;
billing for unnecessary services or equipment;
double billing for the same service or equipment;
billing for phantom patients, or patients who are
deceased;
billing for old services as if they were new;
“unbundling,” that is, billing separately for services
or equipment included in a combined or bundled rate;
“upcoding,” that is, billing for a service or piece of
equipment at a higher rate than was actually provided;
attempting to get reimbursed for non-covered services
by fraudulently labeling them as covered services; and
billing for a canceled service, that is, a medication,
procedure, or service that was prearranged and then
canceled is still billed.19

As seen by the above list, billing schemes can be very diverse.
Some cases of billing fraud can be easily detected if a patient is
aware of this type of fraud and carefully reviews their benefits
statements. Other types of billing fraud are not easily identified.
For example, if a patient reviews a hospital bill, a double-billing
error might be readily apparent, while overbilling might not be as
easily detectable.
In the largest healthcare fraud enforcement action to date,
601 individuals—including 165 doctors, nurses, and other licensed
medical professionals—were charged for their alleged participation
in a false billing scheme amounting to more than $2 billion.20

What Does Health Care Fraud Look Like, NAT’L HEALTHCARE ANTIFRAUD ASS’N, https://www.nhcaa.org/news/what-does-health-care-fraud-look
-like.aspx [https://perma.cc/HQV5-3UQG].
19 Id.; Ron Cresswell, Health Care Fraud: 5 Common Health Schemes,
ACFEINSIGHTS (Dec. 12, 2018), https://acfeinsights.squarespace.com/acfe-in
sights/2018/12/12/health-care-fraud-5-common-billing-schemes [https://perma
.cc/JB8R-DUFR].
20 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., National Health Care Fraud Takedown
Results in Charges Against 601 Individuals Responsible for Over $2 Billion in
18
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Allegedly, the defendants took part in schemes to submit claims
to Medicaid, Medicare, TRICARE (a health insurance program
for veterans of the Armed Forces and their family members), and
private insurance companies for medically unnecessary treatments and, often, never provided.21 In these schemes, patient
recruiters, beneficiaries, and other co-conspirators purportedly
paid cash in return for supplying beneficiary information to providers.22 With this information, the providers could then submit
fraudulent bills to Medicare.23 Particularly significant in this
case is the number of medical professionals charged, as almost
every healthcare fraud scheme involving Medicare or Medicaid
requires the participation of a corrupt medical professional.24
B.Kickbacks
Another common fraudulent scheme is the payment of “kickbacks” in return for influencing the provision of healthcare.25 Kickbacks can corrupt a medical provider’s decision-making and make
profit, rather than a patient’s welfare, the healthcare provider’s
primary goal.26 Kickbacks can lead to inappropriate medical care,
including incorrect hospitalization, surgery, tests, medications,
and equipment.27 Some of the largest kickback cases have occurred in the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).28
The Veterans’ Health Administration [of the VA] is the largest
integrated health care system in the United States, providing


Fraud Losses (June 28, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/national-health
-care-fraud-takedown-results-charges-against-601-individuals-responsible-over
[https://perma.cc/T5VG-Q5JG].
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Fried et al., Individual and Institutional Corruption in European and US
Healthcare: Overview and Link of Various Corruption Typologies (2018), https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5940713/ [https://perma.cc/947B-Y6S8].
26 Id.
27 See id.
28 See Former Department of Veterans Affairs Official Sentenced to 46 Months
In Prison for Taking $1.2 Million in Kickbacks, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (2015),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/former-department-veterans-affairs-official
-sentenced-46-months-prison-taking-12-million [https://perma.cc/9HFT-NP95].
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care at 1,255 health care facilities, including 170 VA Medical
Centers and 1,074 outpatient sites of care of varying complexity
(VHA outpatient clinics) to over 9 million veterans enrolled in
the VA health care program.29

If you consider that kickback schemes involving specific
contracts and referrals, this system presents a huge opportunity
for fraudsters.30 In the below example, an indictment alleges that
defendants made materially false statements and omissions in
the course of applying for a $59 million contract with the VA.31
Contracts that large are not common in most healthcare systems.32
But a contract with the VA national system can be worth tens of
millions of dollars.33
Former VA podiatry chief Anthony Lazzarino and Sunrise
Shoes CEO Peter Wong were charged with healthcare fraud, conspiracy to pay and receive kickbacks on medical referrals, and
conspiracy to commit wire fraud.34 The indictment alleged that
between March 2008 and February 2015, Lazzarino and Wong
engaged in a scheme to defraud the VA by billing the VHA for
custom work and services that were prescribed but not supplied
in shoes delivered to veterans.35 Specifically, the two men teamed
up to bill the VA for nearly $1.7 million worth of specialized shoes,
some of them costing as much as $1,682 a pair, while veterans
received only “off-the-shelf” products from Sunrise Shoes.36
In addition, the indictment alleges that Lazzarino referred
patients directly to Sunrise Shoes, in violation of VA policy, and
agreed with Wong to offer kickbacks in return for such referrals.37
Specifically, Lazzarino made sure veterans were steered to Sunrise


29 Veterans Health Administration, DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., https://www
.va.gov/health/aboutvha.asp [https://perma.cc/7SGY-76JD].
30 See A Roadmap for New Physicians: Fraud & Abuse Laws, OFF. OF
INSPECTOR GEN., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-education/01laws
.asp [https://perma.cc/9JX4-HXWC].
31 Sealed Indictment at 11–12, Lazzarino, No.2:16-CR-0237 TLN (E.D.
Cal. Dec. 15, 2016), ECF No.1.
32 Id.
33 As discussed earlier in this section, the Veterans’ Health Administration
[of the VA] is the largest integrated healthcare system in the United States.
34 Sealed Indictment at 18, Lazzarino, No.2:16-CR-0237 TLN (E.D. Cal.
Dec. 15, 2016), ECF No.1.
35 Id. at 3–4.
36 Id. at 3–5.
37 Id. at 6–10.
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by handing them the store’s business card and making disparaging comments about other vendors.38
Further, the indictment alleges that Lazzarino and Wong
agreed to make materially false statements and omissions to the
VA regarding where the shoes were manufactured in the course
of applying for a contract with the VA.39 At the time of this writing, neither party has been convicted on these alleged charges.40
“If convicted, Lazzarino and Wong face a maximum statutory
penalty of 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine for each healthcare fraud count, and five years in prison and a $250,000 fine for
each of the two conspiracy counts.”41
C.Medical Identity Theft
Increased cybersecurity threats and identity theft have
led to a rise in an expensive and dangerous offspring in the
healthcare sector: medical identity theft.42 According to the Department of Health and Human Services, medical identity theft
is one of the fastest-growing areas of healthcare fraud.43 In this
type of fraud, medical information is often stolen by employees
at medical facilities to sell on the black market for a profit or by
an uninsured individual who needs medical treatment.44 Thieves
may also hack into pacemakers, insulin pumps, medical databases
or even break into medical facilities.45 Medical identity thieves

Id. at 4.
Id. at 3–5.
40 Id. at 17–18.
41 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Former VA Podiatry Chief and Sunrise
Shoes CEO Indicted for Health Care Fraud Scheme (Dec. 16, 2016), https://
www.justice.gov/usao-edca/pr/former-va-podiatry-chief-and-sunrise-shoes-ceo
-indicted-health-care-fraud-scheme [https://perma.cc/LS5Q-N9ZE].
42 Michael Ollove, The Rise of Medical Identity Theft in Healthcare, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 7, 2014), https://khn.org/news/rise-of-indentity-theft/ [https://
perma.cc/PFX3-4LGY].
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 By the Numbers: Fraud Statistics, COALITION AGAINST INS. FRAUD (2016),
http://www.insurancefraud.org/statistics.htm [https://perma.cc/W4NW-45MW].
See generally Katherine Booth Wellington, Cyberattacks on Medical Devices and
Hospital Networks: Legal Gaps and Regulatory Solution, 30 SANTA CLARA
COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 139 (2014).
38
39
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often use false or stolen personal medical data to create claims
and bill the victim’s health insurance company.46
Not only is medical identity theft very costly for the victim,
it also causes great stress.47 According to a survey by the Ponemon
Institute, 65 percent of victims paid an average of $13,500 to
repair the harm done by this type of theft.48 In addition to the
significant costs, it is time-consuming to resolve medical identity
theft.49 In another survey by Ponemon Institute, victims of medical identity theft spent 200 hours correcting their compromised
data.50 But worse, a victim’s medical history can be permanently
altered, with diseases or injuries the victim never had falsely entered into records, further harming the victim by having the wrong
medical information (for example, incorrect blood type) on file.51
Unfortunately, many people who are victims of medical identity theft may not find out until months later.52 “Few consumers
[even] know what medical identity theft is or how much this crime
can damage their credit and health.”53 Only 15 percent of adults
state that they are familiar with medical identity theft.54 Of those,
only 38 percent could correctly define “medical identity.”55 Targets of medical identity theft particularly include the elderly and
disabled, who are less likely to notice that anything is wrong.56
Individuals can protect their information from being stolen in the
first place by being careful when discarding items containing health
information, such as billing statements and prescription bottles.57
The explanation of benefits documents should also be carefully
reviewed to spot potential red flags.58


Wellington, supra note 45, at 151.
COALITION AGAINST INS. FRAUD, supra note 45.
48 Fifth Annual Study on Identity Theft (2016), PONEMON INST., http://medi
dfraud.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2014_Medical_ID_Theft_Study1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8X5D-6DS3].
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 COALITION AGAINST INS. FRAUD, supra note 45.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Michelino Mancini, Medical Identity Theft in the Emergency Department:
Awareness is Crucial, NCBI (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
/pmc/articles/PMC4251251/ [https://perma.cc/B5C6-FCYH].
57 PONEMON INST., supra note 48.
58 Id.
46
47
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“Most cases of medical identity theft occur through the
emergency department [in hospitals].”59 Doctors working in hospitals can also be victims of medical identity theft, for example,
when blank prescription forms are stolen and then sold in the
black market.60 In 2011, the Latin Kings gang from New York
was found to be trafficking stolen prescription forms with forged
signatures.61 These prescriptions, mostly for the addictive painkiller Oxycodone, were sold by the gang nationwide for $100 to
$300 to users seeking drugs.62 The prescriptions were stolen from
local New York hospitals due to poor controls and safeguards, and
the incident was part of a large national trafficking scheme involving up to 1.4 million prescription forms.63
In an attempt to address medical identity theft, new technologies have been developed that can help health insurers reduce
the chance of being defrauded.64 Most insurers use basic tools
such as automated red flags and business rules.65 But advanced


59 John Dumfries, Healthcare Fraud and Medical Identity Theft in Canada
and USA (Oct. 9, 2012), THE INST. OF INTERNAL AUDITORS CAN., http://
www.wsuccess.com/iia/healthcare_fraud_bw.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9B4-DYL9]
(alteration in quote).
60 See Shantanu Agrawal & Peter Budetti, Physician Medical Identity Theft,
307 JAMA 459 (Feb. 1, 2012), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article
-abstract/1104942 [https://perma.cc/7RZR-GCFG] (“Medical identity theft is the
appropriation or misuse of a patient’s or physician’s unique medical identifying information to obtain or bill public or private payers for fraudulent medical
goods or services. For physicians, this information includes the National Provider Identifier (NPI), Tax Identification Number (TIN), and medical licensure information.”).
61 Robert Lewis & Will Van Sant, NY: Up to 1.4M Prescription Forms Stolen,
NEWSDAY (Oct. 23, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.newsday.com/news/health/ny
-up-to-1-4m-prescription-forms-stolen-1.3265916 [https://perma.cc/R85Y-W2F5].
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 For an example of technology being used to help to detect hospital fraud,
see, e.g. Joan H. Krause, Following the Money in Health Care Fraud: Reflections on
a Modern-Day Yellow Brick Road, 36 AM. J.L. SCI. 343, 349 (2010) (“Health Outcomes Technologies was a software company that developed computer-based
health outcomes measurement and disease management systems. Using this
technology, the company was able to identify hospitals that had billed for bacterial pneumonia at rates far in excess of the national average....”).
65 COALITION AGAINST INS. FRAUD, THE STATE OF INSURANCE FRAUD: A
STUDY OF INSURER USE, STRATEGIES AND PLANS FOR ANTI-FRAUD TECHNOLOGY 4
(Nov. 2016), http://www.insurancefraud.org/downloads/State_of_Insurance
_Fraud_Technology2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/39KB-NETS].
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tools (such as link analysis, predictive modeling, text mining, and
geo-mapping) are not as commonly used by insurers.66 More than
half of insurers cite a lack of IT resources as the main stumbling
block in implementing anti-fraud technology.67
D.Hospital Frauds
Lack of oversight and an overly complex system has led to
the widespread occurrence of healthcare-related fraud in the hospital industry.68 The types of fraud committed relating to hospitals
are multifold.69 These frauds can be divided into frauds committed
“by” hospitals and frauds committed “against” hospitals.70 Some
of the more typical schemes of both types are discussed next.
1.Unnecessary Procedures
When hospitals commit fraud, it is often in the form of unnecessary procedures.71 These frauds can be attributed to several
different reasons.72 For example, hospitals desire to improve their
reputation by having completed a large number of procedures and,

Id. at 4.
Id. at 6.
68 See Passard Dean, Josseibel Vazquez-Gonzalez & Lucy Fricker, Causes
and Challenges of Healthcare Fraud in the US, 4 INT’L J. BUS. SOC. SCI. No.
14 at 1–3 (Nov. 2013), https://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol_4_No_14_November
_2013/1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SGX-DY24] (discussing the “complex environment
of the healthcare industry” and “low perceived risk of getting caught” as factors
contributing to the “widespread problem” of healthcare fraud in the United States).
69 See Dana McWay & Seena Kurian, Busting Bad Medicine: A Call to Action Addressing Healthcare, Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, 88 J. AM. HEALTH INFO.
MGMT. ASS’N 32 no. 10 (Oct. 2017), http://library.ahima.org/doc?oid=302311#
.XY5TmEZKhyw [https://perma.cc/QH8Z-M5K2] (discussing common types of
healthcare fraud committed by providers).
70 See James Byrd, Paige Powell & Douglas Smith, Health Care Fraud: An
Introduction to a Major Cost Issue, 14 J. ACCT. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y, 521, 528
(2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2285860 [https://perma.cc/T7VZ-QXVE] (“In
addition to fraud committed by health care providers, individuals commit frauds
against providers and insurers....”).
71 See McWay & Kurian, supra note 69 (listing “[b]illing for services that
were not medically necessary” as one of the common types of healthcare fraud).
72 See generally Dean et al., supra note 68 (exploring multiple aspects of the
healthcare industry that makes it prone to fraud); see also Byrd et al., supra
note 70, at 529 (stating that motivations to commit fraud in the healthcare
industry “are as varied as the number of providers and health care patients”).
66
67
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therefore, appearing to be more proficient at performing them.73
Stringent regulations from the federal Medicare and Medicaid
programs also represent reasons for doctors and hospitals to
commit fraud against their patients.74 But perhaps the largest
pressure is the desire to meet financial goals and create the additional revenues generated by billing for these procedures.75 When
profits are a factor, hospitals can habitually upgrade patients to
more expensive therapies even when lower cost alternatives offer a
better outcome for the patient.76 Also, as the demand for hospital
services has declined with individuals seeking less costly alternatives, hospitals have sought additional ways of generating revenues.77 Unnecessary aggressive chemotherapy, cancer treatments,
infusion therapies, and cardiac procedures are some examples of
unnecessary procedures performed by hospitals.78 The following


73 See United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d
370, 374 (5th Cir. 2004) (Complainant stated that “in apparent pursuit of
prestige by being industry leaders in terms of number of heart transplants
performed, Defendants performed unnecessary heart transplants”); REBECCA
SALTIEL BUSCH, HEALTHCARE FRAUD, AUDITING AND DETECTION GUIDE 9 (John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2d ed. 2012) (listing “[c]ompetitive advantage” as one of the
targets of healthcare fraud).
74 Byrd et al., supra note 70, at 527–28 (stating that to avoid “fines or penalties” or “closure of a facility” by Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, a
provider may conduct “unnecessary services”).
75 Aaron E. Carroll, The High Costs of Unnecessary Care, 318 JAMA no. 9
1748, 1749 (2017), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2662877
[https://perma.cc/R4XW-NQFR] (noting a “recent survey found that more than 70
[percent] of physicians believe that physicians are more likely to perform unnecessary procedures when they profit from them” and the reimbursement system
that increases revenue for healthcare providers when they provide more care).
76 Shefali Luthra, Infusion Treatments—Needed or Not—Can Deplete Patients’
Wallets, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (AUG. 2, 2019), https://khn.org/news/infusion
-treatments-for-low-iron-can-deplete-patients-wallets/ [https://perma.cc/2CTL
-PX7Z] (noting how Medicare and private insurance’s reimbursement system
gives providers an incentive to pick the newer, more expensive option).
77 See Melanie Evans, U.S. Hospital Profits Fall as Labor Costs Grow and
Patient Mix Shifts, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.wsj
.com/articles/u-s-hospital-profits-fall-as-labor-costs-grow-and-patient-mix-shifts
-1524495601 [https://perma.cc/U4FP-83PU].
78 See Luthra, supra note 76 (finding hospital use of unnecessary infusions); Mustaqeem Siddiqui & Vincent Rajkumar, The High Cost of Cancer Drugs
and What We Can Do About It, 87 MAYO CLINIC STET. 935, 938 (Oct. 2012),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3538397/pdf/main.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L6QJ-5Z6X] (“Physicians receiving more generous Medicare reimbursements ... used more costly [cancer] treatment regimens.”).
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case demonstrates how one hospital extracted funds illegally
from Medicare and Medicaid by performing unnecessary procedures on its patients.
In 2014, Saint Joseph London Hospital agreed to pay the
U.S. government $16.5 million to settle “civil allegations that it
submitted false or fraudulent claims to the Medicare and Kentucky
Medicaid programs for a variety of medically unnecessary heart
procedures.”79 Between 2008 and 2011, “several doctors working
at the hospital performed numerous invasive cardiac procedures”—
“which included coronary stents, pacemakers, coronary artery
bypass graft surgeries (“CABGS”), and diagnostic catheterizations”—“on Medicare and Medicaid patients who did not need
them.”80
To better understand this example of hospital fraud, it
helps to consider a specific case of a doctor involved in the Saint
Joseph London case. One of the doctors at that hospital, Dr. Anis
Chalhoub, was sentenced by U.S. District Court “to serve 42 months
in federal prison” and pay monetary fines and damages for healthcare fraud.81
In April 2018, a federal jury returned a guilty verdict, after hearing evidence that Dr. Chalhoub defrauded Medicare, Medicaid,
and other insurers by implanting medically unnecessary pacemakers in his patients and causing the unnecessary procedures
and follow-up care to be billed to health insurance programs.
Between 2007 and 2011, Dr. Chalhoub implanted approximately
234 pacemakers in patients at St. Joseph London hospital. The
evidence at trial showed that dozens of those patients’ pacemakers were medically unnecessary under well-established national
guidelines and Medicare coverage rules. A number of patients
testified at trial that Dr. Chalhoub pressured them into getting the procedures [and misled them] about their health conditions. For instance, several patients recalled Dr. Chalhoub
telling them that they might die without a pacemaker. Sinus


Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Saint Joseph London Hospital to Pay
$16.5 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations of Unnecessary Heart
Procedures (Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edky/pr/saint-joseph
-london-hospital-pay-165-million-settle-false-claims-act-allegations [https://per
ma.cc/P8NQ-Q9Z3].
80 Id.
81 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, London Cardiologist Sentenced to
42 Months for Health Care Fraud (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao
-edky/pr/london-cardiologist-sentenced-42-months-health-care-fraud [https://
perma.cc/SC9Y-ZVAQ].
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node dysfunction, the diagnosis Dr. Chalhoub gave the patients,
is a non-fatal condition. The jury also heard evidence that
Medicare, Medicaid, and other insurers suffered hundreds of
thousands of dollars in losses from Dr. Chalhoub’s unnecessary procedures.82

A so-called “hospital-physician transaction,” which is any
cooperation between a hospital and a physician, can also have
the potential for healthcare fraud.83 According to the Stark Law
and the False Claims Act (both discussed below), hospitals are prohibited from submitting claims to Medicare for patients referred
to the hospital by physicians who have a “prohibited financial
relationship” with the hospital.84 These parties could potentially
negotiate for a transaction for less or more than fair market value.85
A legitimate hospital-physician relationship is one where the physician is paid fair market value, meaning the amount paid in an
arm’s-length transaction.86 Hospital-physician transactions can
be complex, such that illegal activities are not always clear-cut.87
In the following case, involving an illegal hospital-physician
transaction, however, the transactions were clearly not paid at
fair market value.88 The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) obtained


Id.
See Leigh Walton et al., Hospitals Employing Physicians: A Practical
Guide to Buying Physician Practices and Compensating Employed Doctors, 22
HEALTH L. 1, 5 (2009) (“In an effort to prevent fraud and abuse in the healthcare system, federal and state laws impose significant restrictions on the manner
in which hospitals compensate physicians for the items and services they provide
to the hospital.”).
84 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012) (also called the Stark Law); False
Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012).
85 See Walton et al., supra note 83, at 9 (stating to avoid considerations of
fraud “it is critical that a hospital purchasing a physician practice buy the
practice for a price that does not exceed fair market value”).
86 Lisa Ohrin, Daryl Johnson Macc & Lawrence Vernaglia, Fair Market
Value and Commercial Reasonableness in Hospital/Physician Transactions:
What’s the Difference?, Roundtable Webinar Discussion, American Health
Lawyers Association (Jan. 3, 2012), https://www.healthlawyers.org/Events/Webi
nars/RoundtableDiscussions/2011/Documents/roundtable_discussion_slides_0
10312.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A3Q-TFGY].
87 See Walton et al., supra note 83, at 9.
88 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Resolves $237 Million False Claims Act Judgment against South Carolina Hospital that Made
Illegal Payments to Referring Physicians (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.justice
.gov/opa/pr/united-states-resolves-237-million-false-claims-act-judgment-against
-south-carolina-hospital [https://perma.cc/JJM4-SGA4].
82
83
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a $237 million judgment against South Carolina–based Tuomey
Healthcare System Inc., which was accused of having a referral
agreement with physicians.89 Tuomey entered into contracts with
19 physicians that required the physicians to refer their outpatient procedures to Tuomey to avoid losing lucrative outpatient
procedure referrals to a surgery center.90 In exchange, Tuomey
paid the physicians “compensation that far exceeded fair market
value and included part of the money it received from Medicare
for the referred procedures”.91 The DOJ “reached a $1 million
settlement with Ralph J. Cox III”, the former CEO of Tuomey
Healthcare System, for his involvement in the hospital’s illegal
Medicare and Medicaid billings for services referred by physicians with whom the hospital had improper financial relationships.92 “Under the terms of the settlement agreement”, Cox was
also “excluded from participating in federal healthcare programs,
including management or administrative services paid for by federal
healthcare programs, for four years.”93
2.Embezzlement
Healthcare frauds are also committed against hospitals.94
These often take the form of embezzlement, where an unauthorized
benefit is shifted from the hospital to the fraudster.95 Employees,
from secretaries to CEOs, can become fraudsters and embezzle
funds from hospitals just as easily as they can in any other business.96 When people are placed in positions of trust over large
sums of money, such as is the case in hospitals, the risk of embezzlement is amplified.97 Also, hospitals are often not-for-profit


Id.
Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 See Byrd et al., supra note 70, at 529.
95 See generally Deborah R. Mathis & Michael S. Lewis, Employee Embezzlement: A Growing Problem, 25 J. MED. PRAC. MGMT. 146 (2009) (discussing
embezzlement in healthcare).
96 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Ex-CEO of Imperial Valley Hospital
Pleads Guilty to Fraud and Embezzlement (July 31, 2013), https://archives.fbi
.gov/archives/sandiego/press-releases/2013/ex-ceo-of-imperial-valley-hospital
-pleads-guilty-to-fraud-and-embezzlement [https://perma.cc/ZJU9-2X8Q].
97 See Joseph T. Wells, Why Employees Commit Fraud, J. ACCT. (Feb. 1,
2001), https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2001/feb/whyemployees
89
90
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organizations, which means an increased risk of embezzlement, as
hospitals often have fewer employees and less segregation of duties.98 The following two cases highlight how employees of hospitals embezzled funds from employers through various methods.
In the first case, William Roe, CFO of Danbury Hospital
in Hartford, Connecticut, set up a fake software company and
then approved payments totaling $95,000 for services never performed.99 He also fraudulently received $46,166 when he altered
the appraisal value of his home when Danbury Hospital agreed to
pay the difference between the sales price and the appraised value
as part of his hiring agreement as CFO.100 He was sentenced to
33 months in prison.101 Interestingly, prior to working at Danbury
Hospital, Roe worked for St. Rita Hospital in Ohio where he stole
$75,000 using the same software company scheme.102 If the earlier hospital had decided to prosecute, perhaps the crimes at the
second hospital would have been prevented.
In the second case, Eduora McDaniel, a VA employee, and
Angela Hunter, co-owner of Divine Iron Works, generated purchase orders for fictitious goods and services.103 “They [allegedly]
entered into an agreement to split the VA’s payments for goods
and services Hunter’s company never provided.”104 Divine Iron
Works “was effectively defunct from January 2011 to December


commitfraud.html [https://perma.cc/HJ9X-PUJQ] (“If one person controls both
the books and the assets, the ability to commit fraud is limited only by that
person’s imagination.”).
98 See Mathis & Lewis, supra note 95, at 147 (“Practices that are able to
segregate duties ... will be less vulnerable to embezzlement.”).
99 John Pirro, Former Danbury Hospital Exec Faces Sentencing for Embezzlement, NEWS TIMES (July 10, 2011), http://www.newstimes.com/news/article
/Former-Danbury-Hospital-exec-faces-sentencing-for-1460230.php [https://perma
.cc/GW74-BD78].
100 Id.
101 Edmond Mahoney, Former Danbury Hospital CFO Sentenced In Fraud,
HARTFORD COURANT (July 11, 2011), https://www.courant.com/health/hc-xpm
-2011-07-11-hc-hospital-fraud-0712-20110711-story.html [https://perma.cc
/N2RK-YH72].
102 Id.
103 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, VA Employee and Former Vendor
Charged with Fraud in Alleged Bogus Invoice Scheme (June 12, 2018), https://
www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/va-employee-and-former-vendor-charged-fraud
-alleged-bogus-invoice-scheme [https://perma.cc/YW2T-TU4M].
104 Id.
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2014 and provided no actual goods or services.”105 “[A]s a VA
prosthetics representative, McDaniel had the authority to obtain
prosthetic goods and services if a [VA] physician found them
medically necessary” and she had a government-issued Visa credit
card for this purpose.106 “McDaniel [allegedly] created bogus purchase orders for Hunter’s company, which Hunter used to obtain
payment on McDaniel’s government credit cards.”107
3.Unauthorized Practice
Practicing, attempting to practice or offering to practice a
regulated healthcare profession without a valid license can be a
felony offense carrying minimum mandatory jail penalties (for
example, see Florida Statute § 456.065(2)(d)).108 The following case
illustrates how an unlicensed individual posing as a licensed
medical professional can endanger patients’ health.
Juan Manuel Perez falsely held himself out as a Licensed
Vocational Nurse (LVN).109 In January 2015, Perez obtained
employment with Cleveland Health Care LLC in McAllen, Texas,
falsely claiming to be a LVN.110 Perez presented a license number,
which allegedly belonged to another individual with the same
name.111 However, Perez was not licensed by the Texas Board of
Nursing and was never an LVN.112 From January 2015 through
July 2016, Perez conducted patient home visits and provided
medical services while employed with Cleveland Health Care.113
Perez later utilized the stolen identification to gain employment
with various other area healthcare institutions, including Harlingen Medical Center and Valley Baptist Medical Center.114 Perez


Id.
Id.
107 Id.
108 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.065(2)(d) (West 2001).
109 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., San Benito Man Heads to Prison for
Posing as Licensed Vocational Nurse (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.justice.gov
/usao-sdtx/pr/san-benito-man-heads-prison-posing-licensed-vocational-nurse
[https://perma.cc/4FAV-GN52].
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., San Benito Man Arrested for Posing as
LVN (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/san-benito-man-ar
rested-posing-lvn [https://perma.cc/9BUK-HTJT].
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received a mandatory 24-month prison sentence in connection with
identity misappropriation.115
4.Pharmaceutical and Durable Medical Equipment Fraud
Some of the largest and most complex fraud cases are those
involving pharmaceuticals and durable medical equipment.116
Nationally, there has been a focus on the misuse of and addiction to opioids and other narcotics.117 In fact, in one month (June
2018), the Attorney General and the Department of Health and
Human Services announced that 162 defendants, including 76
doctors, had been charged for their roles in schemes involving
opioids and other narcotics.118 The year-over-year trends are staggering: the DOJ reported that while 90 defendants were charged
in 2014, 301 defendants were charged in 2016, and 601 defendants were charged in 2018.119 Opioid-related fraud losses grew
from $260 million in 2014 to $2 billion in 2018.120
Over half of the states reported narcotic-related fraud cases
from 2018.121 Examples include an indictment in California, where
two podiatrists were accused of providing pre-printed prescriptions,
regardless of need, in exchange for kickbacks, prostitutes, and
expensive meals.122 These prescriptions allegedly amounted to more
than $250 million in fraudulent claims.123 An additional indictment
in Texas claimed that fraudulent prescriptions were used to
order over one million pills of hydrocodone and oxycodone.124 In
this instance, 48 individuals, including a pharmacy chain owner


Id.
See, e.g., Opioid Crisis Response Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-271, 132
Stat. 4012 (2018), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/enforcement/criminal/
[https://perma.cc/9BUK-HTJT].
117 Id.
118 National Health Care Fraud Takedown Results in Charges Against 601
Individuals Responsible for Over $2 Billion in Fraud Losses, supra note 20.
119 Documents and Resources from the June 28, 2018 National Health Care
Fraud and Opioid Takedown Press Conference, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (June 28,
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/documents-and-resources-june-28-2018 [https://
perma.cc/H6PF-Z75Q].
120 Id.
121 National Health Care Fraud Takedown Results in Charges Against 601
Individuals Responsible for Over $2 Billion in Fraud Losses, supra note 20.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
115
116
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and pharmacist, were charged with fraud.125 In a 2018 case, a
Delaware physician was charged with unlawfully prescribing
more than two million units of oxycodone.126 In total, 30 states
and 58 federal districts reported cases in 2018.127
Fraudsters have also targeted durable medical equipment
(DME).128 DME is medical equipment that is prescribed by a treating physician to be used in the home or homelike setting on a repeated basis, such as walkers, wheelchairs, and back braces.129
Fraud related to DME is not new; according to the Government
Accounting Office, DME and medical facilities accounted for 41
percent of all criminal case subjects in 2005 and about 40 percent of all criminal cases brought under the FCA in 2010.130
Fraud related to DME has evolved with healthcare. Over
the past decade, healthcare services have moved from inpatient
settings to clinic settings and then to telemedicine, which allows
providers to diagnose and prescribe medicine to patients via telephone and video.131 In April 2019, the DOJ reported the indictment
of 24 defendants, including CEOs and COOs of five telemedicine
companies, the owners of dozens of DME companies and three
licensed medical professionals.132 In short, the government believed

Id.
Id.
127 Documents and Resources from the June 28, 2018 National Health Care
Fraud and Opioid Takedown Press Conference, supra note 119.
128 For example, in 2011, one of the largest national DME suppliers, HillRom Company, paid $41.8 million to settle allegations that it submitted false
claims over an eight-year period related to medical bed equipment. Hill-Rom
Company, Inc. Will Pay $41.8 Million to Resolve Federal Healthcare Fraud
Investigation, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 27, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/ar
chive/usao/tne/news/2011/September/092711A%20Hill-Rom%20Settlement.html
[https://perma.cc/J2PK-K9PZ].
129 Durable Medical Equipment (DME), HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.health
care.gov/glossary/durable-medical-quipment-DME [https://perma.cc/88C8-H7N7].
130 Health Care Fraud: Types of Providers Involved in Medicare, Medicaid,
and the Children’s Health Insurance, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (Sept.
2012), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-820 [https://perma.cc/8KR6-AW7V].
131 The Ultimate Telemedicine Guide: What is Telemedicine?, EVISIT (May 25,
2018), https://evisit.com/resources/what-is-telemedicine/ [https://perma.cc/J5
E2-PAVN].
132 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Federal Indictments & Law Enforcement
Actions in One of the Largest Health Care Fraud Schemes Involving Telemedicine and Durable Medical Equipment Marketing Executives Results in Charges
125
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that the indicted medical providers worked with telemedicine
companies to provide elderly and disabled Medicare beneficiaries with unneeded back, shoulder, and knee braces, resulting in
a loss to Medicare of over one billion dollars.133 Allegedly, the
telemarketers phoned Medicare beneficiaries, promised free or
low-cost orthopedic braces, had physicians who had not treated
or evaluated the patients sign prescriptions for the braces, then
sold the prescriptions to DME companies who shipped the braces
and billed Medicare.134 It is believed that the fraudsters then
laundered the money through shell companies to purchase cars,
yachts, and property in the United States and abroad.135
In summary, the forms of healthcare fraud are vast. Many
of the fraud cases described above involve similar and overlapping themes. No matter the parties involved, the schemes often
include behavior such as billing for services never provided, misstatements of facts, giving kickbacks, stealing information, and
committing wire fraud.136 The following section discusses the laws
enacted to control fraud in the medical industry.
II.MAJOR FEDERAL CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAWS THAT
RELATE TO HEALTHCARE FRAUD
A.Federal False Claims Act
The Federal False Claims Act (FCA)137 was originally enacted in 1863 to protect the federal government from fraud perpetrated by unscrupulous Civil War contractors.138 Today the law
is aimed at those responsible for the $100 billion or more in

Against 24 Individuals Responsible for Over $1.2 Billion in Losses (Apr. 9, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-indictments-and-law-enforcement-actions
-one-largest-health-care-fraud-schemes [https://perma.cc/NX5A-RUG9].
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Federation of American Scientists, Bribery, Kickbacks, and Self-Dealing:
An Overview of Honest Services Fraud and Issues for Congress, CONG. RES.
SERV. (Jan. 30, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45479.pdf [https://perma
.cc/3WQ6-D89M].
137 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2018).
138 The False Claims Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov
/civil/false-claims-act [https://perma.cc/6A8S-ACLR].
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fraudulent activity diverted every year from federal healthcare,
defense, and other programs.139 “In addition to ... monetary losses,
fraud also ... erodes public confidence and raises questions about
the government’s ability to manage its programs.”140
The current version of the FCA makes liable “[a]ny person
who ... knowingly presents or causes to be presented ... a false or
fraudulent claim [to the U.S. government] for payment or approval.”141 The law also imposes liability for making “false record(s) or statement(s) ... [designed] to conceal, avoid, or decrease
an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the [United
States] government.”142


139 M. CRAIN, W. HOPWOOD, C. PACINI & G. YOUNG, THE ESSENTIALS OF
FORENSIC ACCOUNTING 525 (2015).
140 J. Morgan Phelps, The False Claims Act’s Public Disclosure Bar: Defining the Law Between Parasitic and Beneficial, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 247, 247 (1999).
141 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2018).
142 Id. § 3729(a)(2). Sections 3729(a)(1) and (2) are the most frequently used
provision of the FCA. Section 3729(a) states in relevant part:
Any person who—
(A)
Knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, ... a
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(B)
Knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a
false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim;
(C)
Conspires to commit a violation of subparagraph (A),
(B), (C), (D), (E), (F), or (G);
(D)
Has possession, custody, or control of property or money
used, or to be used, by the Government and knowingly
delivers, or causes to be delivered, less than all of that
money or property;
(E)
Is authorized to make or deliver a document certifying
receipt of property used, or to be used, by the Government
and, intending to defraud the Government, makes or
delivers the receipt without completely knowing that
the information on the receipt is true;
(F)
Knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public property from an officer or employee
of the Government, or a member of the Armed Forces,
who lawfully may not sell or pledge property; or
(G)
Knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used,
a false record or statement material to an obligation to
pay or transmit money or property to the Government,
or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly
avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit
money or property to the Government,
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Many FCA violations involve submission of false information
while presenting payments to the federal government.143 Two examples of false healthcare claims can be found in U.S. v. Rogan144
and U.S. v. Cabrera-Diaz.145 Using a unique characteristic of the
FCA known as the qui tam action, private citizens, rather than government attorneys, are allowed to challenge FCA violations.146
A qui tam plaintiff, also referred to as a qui tam relator or
a whistleblower, is a private citizen who files a civil lawsuit
against an alleged fraudster on behalf of himself and the US
government.147 If the government does not pursue the action, the
relator pursuing the case is entitled to “not less than 25 percent
and not more than 30 percent of the proceeds of the action or
settlement and shall be paid out of such proceeds.”148 In addition, the qui tam plaintiff is entitled to collect from the defendant reasonable attorneys’ fees, and expenses from pursuing the
claim.149 In the event the defendant retaliates against the plaintiff through discharge, demotion, suspension, harassment, or discrimination in any other manner, the plaintiff shall be entitled
“to all relief necessary to make the [plaintiff] whole.”150 If the
federal government intervenes in the lawsuit initiated by the qui
tam relator, the latter is still entitled to “at least 15 percent but
not more than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim, depending upon the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action.”151

(H)

Is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty....
143 The False Claims Act: A Primer, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.jus
tice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U6J4-5ZBR].
144 See 459 F. Supp. 2d 692, 692 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2005). This case involved alleged falsification of annual reports to Medicare.
145 See 106 F. Supp. 2d 234, 234 (D.P.R. 2000). This case involved alleged
false claims submitted to Medicare for anesthesia services.
146 “Qui tam” is a term derived from the Latin phrase “qui tam pro domino
rege quam pro se, ipso in hac parte requites,” which means, “who as well for
the king as himself sues in this matter.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1262 (7th
ed. 1999).
147 Id.
148 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (2018).
149 Id.
150 Id. § 3730(h)(1).
151 Id. § 3730(d).
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Because the FCA’s damages and penalty provisions tend
to generate large dollar settlements and judgments, relators’
recoveries can involve substantial amounts.152 The following are
a few examples: In 2013, Johnson and Johnson agreed to pay the
federal government more than $2.2 billion to resolve commercial
and civil liability under the FCA related to the prescription
drugs Risperdal, Invega, and Natrecor.153 Pfizer, Inc. and its
subsidiary, Pharmacia & Upjohn Company, Inc., agreed to pay
$2.3 billion, one of the largest healthcare fraud settlements in
history, for violation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and to
pay $1 billion under the FCA for illegally promoting various
drugs, including Bextra, Geodon, Zyvox, and Lyrica.154 Global
healthcare company GlaxoSmithKline agreed to plead guilty and
pay $3 billion to resolve criminal and civil liability from the unlawful promotion of certain drugs and report safety violations,
including $2 billion to resolve civil liabilities (including off-label
promotion and kickbacks) under the FCA related to Paxil, Wellbutrin, and Avandia.155 The off-label settlement resolves four
lawsuits pending in federal district court in Massachusetts under the qui tam provisions of the FCA.156
The FCA qui tam provision contains two features that make
it quite successful as a regulatory and external corporate governance tool. First, the law facilitates the dissemination of inside
information of fraud.157 Complex financial crimes often cannot


152 James F. Barger, Jr. et al., States, Statutes, and Fraud: An Empirical
Study of Emerging State False Claims Acts, 80 TUL. L. REV. 465, 476 (2005).
153 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Johnson & Johnson to Pay More Than
$2.2 Billion to Resolve Criminal and Civil Investigations (Nov. 4, 2013), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/johnson-johnson-pay-more-than-22-billion-resolve-crimi
nal-and -civil-investigations [https://perma.cc/XV2P-47HQ].
154 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Announces
Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its History (Sept. 2, 2009), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-largest-health-care-fraud
-settlement-its-history [https://perma.cc/5VKX-FBQE].
155 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and
Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety
Data (July 2, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/glaxosmithkline-plead-guilty
-and-pay-3-billion-resolve-fraud-allegations-and-failure-report [https://perma.cc
/4RXA-7BFX].
156 Id.
157 Carl Pacini & Michael. B. Hood, The Role of Qui Tam Actions Under
the False Claims Act in Preventing and Deterring Fraud Against Government,
15 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 273, 276 (2007).
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be detected without the assistance of those who have knowledge
of them.158 However, convincing people to inform or turn on their
employer, co-workers, and partners is not an easy task.159 Second,
the statute provides a means for knowledgeable qui tam plaintiffs
to supplement the strained resources of government attorneys and
investigators.160 This resource supplement is accomplished through
the required statutory procedures or protocol.161
A qui tam relator who sues under the FCA does so both in
an individual capacity and on behalf of the US government.162 A
copy of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially all
material evidence and information possessed by the qui tam plaintiff must be filed in camera and a copy must be sent to the Department of Justice (DOJ).163 “The purpose of the written disclosure
requirement is to provide the United States with enough information on alleged fraud to be able to make a well-reasoned decision
on whether it should participate in the filed lawsuit or allow the
relator to proceed alone.”164
Although FCA lawsuits have grown during the past decades, the federal government has declined to intervene in almost
two-thirds of said lawsuits.165 When the federal government
decides to not get involved, a case is much less likely to result in
a recovery.166 From 1987 to September 30, 2017, FCA recoveries
totaled over $36 billion.167 Over $28 billion, or close to 79 percent of that total, has occurred when the US government intervened.168 Much of the $36 billion recovered has involved healthcare fraud claims, which includes providers (e.g., hospitals, nursing


Id. at 276–77.
Phelps, supra note 140, at 248.
160 Barger, Jr. et al., supra note 152, at 475–76.
161 Id. at 476.
162 Id.
163 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2018).
164 United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 554, 555 (C.D. Cal.
2003) (quoting United States ex rel. Woodward v. Country View Care Ctr.,
Inc., 797 F. 2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986)).
165 D. Baker, Comment, A Whole New World of False-Claims-Act Liability:
The 2009 Amendments and Learning Where to Draw the Line, 61 CATH. U. L.
REV. 201, 228 (2011).
166 Id.
167 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: CIVIL DIVISION, FRAUD STATISTICS—HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES 2017 (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-re
lease/file/1020116/download [https://perma.cc/TUF5-7LZN].
168 Id.
158
159
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homes, physicians), pharmaceutical firms, medical device makers,
and suppliers.169
In the fiscal year ended September 30, 2016, the DOJ recovered more than $4.7 billion in FCA civil cases.170 Of the $4.7 billion
recovered, 53 percent (or over $2.5 billion) came from the healthcare industry.171 In the fiscal year ended September 30, 2017,
the DOJ recouped more than $3.7 billion in FCA civil cases.172 Of
that amount, over 64 percent (or $2.4 billion) involved healthcare
industry claims.173 The FCA has become the primary law used to
pursue healthcare fraud.174
1.Qui Tam Elements
The FCA applies to a wide range of misconduct that is potentially harmful to the federal treasury.175 In 2009, Congress
enacted into law the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act
(FERA),176 which expanded liability exposure under the FCA.
Prior to the enactment of FERA, liability did not attach under
Section 3729(a)(1) unless a defendant presented a false claim for
payment or approval to an “employee of the United States government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States.”177
Today, the false claim can be presented to anyone for payment,
as long as the federal government has or will provide part or all
of the money to pay the claim.178


Deborah R. Farringer, From Guns That Do Not Shoot to Foreign Staplers: Has the Supreme Court’s Materiality Standard Under Escobar Provided
Clarity for the Health Care Industry About Fraud Under the False Claims
Act?, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 1227, 1236 (2018).
170 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers Over
$4.7 Billion From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2016 (Dec. 14, 2016),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-47-billion-false
-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2016 [https://perma.cc/RMR4-8CFD].
171 Id.
172 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers From
False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2017 (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.jus
tice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-37-billion-falseclaims-act-cases
-fiscal-year2017 [https://perma.cc/Q35Y-JFKS].
173 Id.
174 See generally id.
175 See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012).
176 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123
Stat. 1617 (2009) (codified as amended in 18 and 31 U.S.C.).
177 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006).
178 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012).
169
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a.“Claim”
The determination of whether an actual “claim” has been
made is often not a simple task but is easier than before the
amendments enacted by FERA. As amended by FERA, a “claim”
is “any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or otherwise, for money or property and whether
the United States has title to the money or property.”179 “Claim”
includes any demand for money or property if it is to be spent or
used on behalf of the federal government or to advance a government program or interest.180 In some circumstances, lawyers
and other parties must look to sources outside the FCA to ascertain whether a “claim” has been adequately set forth.181
For instance, regulations and statutes define what is a
“claim” for payment under Medicare. Under subparts of title 42 of
the Code of Federal Regulation, the federal government promises to
pay only costs that are “reasonable and necessary.”182 Hence, requesting the government to pay for medical tests under Medicare
without the required physician supervision under part B is equivalent to asking for payment for something that is not a contractual
claim payable under part B.183 Lack of compliance with Part B’s
regulations would potentially fail the “claim” requirement under
Part B.184
The FCA does not attach liability to the underlying fraudulent activity or to the government’s wrongful payment, but to the
“claim for payment or approval.”185 In deciding whether a false
statement is a claim or demand for payment or approval, a court
should determine whether the statement had the practical effect
of inducing wrongful payment.186

Id. § 3729(b)(2)(A).
Id. § 3729(b)(2).
181 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.15(4)(k), 415.50–70 (2018).
182 Id.
183 Kamal Al-Salihi, Keeping It Simple: Finding Falsity Under the False
Claims Act, 36 WHITTIER L. REV. 431, 448 (2015).
184 Id.
185 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012).
186 United States v. Rivera, 55 F.3d 703, 709–10 (1st Cir. 1995); United
States v. Richard Dattner Architects, 972 F. Supp. 738, 746–47 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
179
180
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An FCA claim must allege that the defendant submitted
either a legally fraudulent or legally false claim.187 A legally
false claim occurs when a government funds recipient has certified compliance with a regulation or law as a condition, but
knowingly failed to comply.188 A factually false claim involves a
reimbursement request containing an improper listing of services
rendered or goods provided.189 Moreover, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (FRCP) 9(b) requires a qui tam plaintiff to state with
particularity the facts constituting fraud.190 It is significant to
note that, since most FCA cases end in settlement,191 the decision on whether FRCP 9(b) has been met holds much importance
in the upshot of a given FCA lawsuit.192
b.Made “Knowingly” or “Know”
Section 3729(b)(1)(A) indicates that the presenter of information satisfies the “knowingly” or “knowledge” requirement
if he or she “has actual knowledge ... acts in deliberate ignorance
of the truth or falsity ... or acts in reckless disregard of the truth
or falsity of the information” presented.193 The statute further
provides that “no proof of specific intent to defraud” is necessary.194
The requisite intent is the presentation of what is known to be
false.195
Although the FCA does not provide a definition of reckless
disregard, the concept embodies a conscious indifference to the


Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., 830 F. Supp. 2d 8, 16 (D.N.J. 2011);
see also United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d
295, 305 (3rd Cir. 2011).
188 Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 701 (2d Cir. 2001).
189 United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d
1211, 1217 (10th Cir. 2008).
190 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
191 Latham’s Lauer on Defending False Claims Act Cases, 22 CORP. CRIM.
REP. 8, 3 (Feb. 25, 2008), http://www.lw.com/mediacoverage/lathams-lauer-on
-defending-false-claims-act-cases [https://perma.cc/QE3U-7PFK].
192 Taylor Chenery & Nicholas A. Deuschle, Supreme Court Asked to Review Pleading Standard and Constitutionality of FCA, BASS, BERRY & SIMS
P.L.C.: INSIDE THE FCA (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.insidethefca.com/fca
-pleading-standard-constitutionality/ [https://perma.cc/TB7V-BP42].
193 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A) (2012).
194 Id. § 3729(b)(1)(B).
195 United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma Cty. Water Agency, 929 F. 2d
1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1991).
187
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falsity of a claim.196 Negligence and innocent mistake, however,
are not sufficient to establish liability.197 An interesting application of the “knowingly” requirement in a healthcare scenario occurred in United States v. Lorenzo.198 It is a fine application of
reckless disregard meeting the knowledge requirement of the FCA.
By not requiring proof of specific intent to defraud, Congress and the judiciary have extended liability to almost anyone
associated with a false or fraudulent claim. Healthcare providers
and others who submit claims for payment to the government thus
have a strong incentive to make sure their claims are accurately
presented. The knowledge requirement makes it risky for individuals to look the other way with regard to a fraudulent claim.199
The knowledge requirement is not always a simple question of whether the qui tam defendant knew of the truth or falsity
of a representation.200 Because many entities entailed in FCA
litigation are large, multidimensional firms, some courts judicially
impose a second test: not only must there exist an affirmative
recognition of falsity, such falsity must be consciously presented
to the government.201
c.“False” or “Fraudulently”
The Supreme Court has stated that the FCA is not designed
to reach every kind of fraud committed against the government.202
The words “false” and “fraudulent” are not defined by Congress


Al-Salihi, supra note 183, at 446.
United States v. Oakwood Downriver Med. Ctr., 687 F. Supp. 302, 305
(E.D. Mich. 1988).
198 United States v. Lorenzo, 768 F. Supp. 1127, 1129 (E.D. Pa. 1991). In that
case, Dr. Lorenzo and several other dentists performed oral cancer screenings
as part of routine dental examinations at nursing homes in Pennsylvania and
New Jersey. Id. at 1129. The cancer screenings, after being billed to Medicaid, were then billed to Medicare as limited consultations. Id. at 1129–30.
The evidence showed that Lorenzo knew that Medicare rules did not allow
procedures during routine screenings to be deemed “limited consultations.”
Id. at 1131. The district court found that Lorenzo, at the very least, acted in
reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the claims made. Id. at 1132.
199 Christopher Frieden, Protecting the Government’s Interests: Qui Tam
Actions Under the False Claims Act and the Government’s Right to Veto Settlements of Those Actions, 47 EMORY L. J. 1041, 1057–58 (1998).
200 Id. at 1057.
201 Hindo v. Univ. of Health Sci., 65 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 1995).
202 United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 598 (1958).
196
197
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in the FCA.203 These terms have been held by the Supreme
Court, in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel.
Escobar,204 to have meaning based on common law fraud concepts. For example, because the FCA uses the disjunctive “or,”
no need exists for a qui tam plaintiff to prove a claim is both
false and fraudulent. Either will do.205
Historically, most healthcare FCA cases have involved direct “‘factually false’ claims requesting payment for more expensive categories of care than were provided or services that were
never provided.”206 Qui tam plaintiffs also began to employ the
law against “legally false” claims, where services or items were
provided but the one seeking payment had untruthfully certified
compliance with a statute, regulation, or contractual provision.207
The federal courts have sanctioned two distinct theories of
legal falsity.208 Express certification occurs when a party makes
a false certification concerning a program condition, such as signing
a false certification statement on a document.209 Some federal
courts have extended legal falsity to include implied certification.210 In Escobar, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
[W]e hold that the implied certification theory can be a basis for
liability, at least where two conditions are satisfied: first, the
claim does not merely request payment, but also makes specific
representations about the goods or services provided; and second, the defendant’s failure to disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements makes
those representations misleading half-truths.211


31 U.S.C. § 3279 (2009).
136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016).
205 James B. Helmer, Jr. & Julie Popham, Materiality and the False Claims
Act, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 839, 845 (2003).
206 United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d
1211, 1217 (10th Cir. 2008); Joan H. Krause, Reflections on Certification, Interpretation, and the Quest for Fraud That “Counts” Under the False Claims Act,
2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1811, 1816 (2017).
207 Conner, 543 F.3d at 1217.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 1217–18.
210 Universal Health Serv., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct.
1989, 1995 (2016).
211 Id. at 2001.
203
204
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The Court further held that a misrepresentation must be material to the government’s payment decision.212
The Supreme Court tried to shed further light on the
meaning of “materiality” in this context.213 “We need not decide
whether § 3729(a)(1)(A)’s materiality requirement is governed by
§ 3729(b)(4) or derived directly from the common law. Under any
understanding of the concept, materiality look[s] to the effect on
the likely or actual behavior of the recipient of the alleged misrepresentation.”214 On the other hand, if the government “pays a
particular claim in full despite its actual knowledge that certain
requirements were violated, that is very strong evidence that
those requirements are not material.”215
The Escobar case left open a number of important questions, including the “threshold question of whether we now have
a coherent test defining implied certification.”216 The confounding new questions will generate more litigation over the implied
certification theory.217
It seems that the emphasis of the Escobar decision is the
new focus on the government’s behavior and the defendant’s
knowledge of such behavior.218 Lower federal court cases appear
to indicate a shift toward a materiality standard which requires
evidence that the government was in fact influenced—that is, it
knew of the noncompliance and chose to pay the claim anyway.219
d.Materiality
Based on a straightforward reading of the FCA statute, the
term “material” modifies the “false record” offered in support of a
false claim, not the false claim itself.220 The false record or statement supporting the false claim has to operate in a material way
as a supporting document.221 Thus, the “materiality” requirement is

Id. at 2002.
Id. at 2003.
214 Id. at 2002.
215 Id. at 2003.
216 Krause, supra note 206, at 1830.
217 Id.
218 Farringer, supra note 169, at 1258.
219 United States ex rel. Kelly v. Serco, Inc., 846 F.3d 325, 332 (9th Cir.
2017); Farringer, supra note 169, at 1258.
220 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (2012).
221 Al-Salihi, supra note 183, at 449.
212
213
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germane only to a section 3729(a)(1)(B) cause of action, not a
section 3729(a)(1)(A) lawsuit or legal claim.222
Whatever a healthcare provider or contractor is allegedly
lying about does not have to be material to lead to section
3729(a)(1)(A) or section 3729(a)(1)(B) liability. A threshold requirement exists that any record used to undergird the accuracy
of a false claim must actually support that claim.223 Although a
trivial false claim can give rise to FCA liability, some courts
have judicially grafted the term “material” on to a section
3729(a)(1)(A) analysis (or claim).224 This approach interprets
section 3729(a)(1)(A) as meaning that a healthcare provider faces
FCA liability if he or she “knowingly presents, or causes to be
presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval”
which is “material.”225 In reality, section 3729(a)(1)(A) does not
state this requirement.226
In those cases that apply “materiality” to section
3729(a)(1)(A) claims, the term is defined as whether the false or
fraudulent claim has a natural tendency to influence agency action
or is capable of influencing agency action.227 Contemporary courts
that use a materiality standard for section 3729(a)(1)(A) claims
use a case-by-case fact-intensive analysis to ascertain whether a
particular condition of payment is material.228 In the end, the insertion of materiality into a section 3729(a)(1)(A) analysis muddies
what is actually a clear standard.229
A guilty fraudster under the FCA is liable to the federal
government for a civil penalty of not less than $5000 and not
more than $10,000, plus treble the amount of damages which
the government sustains because of the fraudulent act.230

Id.
Id. at 450.
224 United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., 647 F.3d 377,
394–95 (1st Cir. 2011) (providing an analysis of “material” in terms of the
claim itself).
225 Id. at 389.
226 See generally 31 U.S.C § 3729 (2012).
227 Hutcheson, 647 F.3d at 394 (citations omitted).
228 See United States v. Sci. Application Int’l. Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1269
(D.C. Cir. 2010).
229 Al-Salihi, supra note 183, at 451.
230 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2012).
222
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B.FCA Healthcare Fraud Lawsuits Facilitated by the Affordable
Care Act
Before the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010 (ACA),231 as modified by the Health Care Education and
Reconciliation Act of 2010,232 the FCA had a strong limitation on
filing a qui tam lawsuit, known as the public disclosure bar.233
The FCA used to possess a two-part test to determine whether a
federal court could hear a qui tam case.234 First, the court had to
ascertain whether the fraud allegations were based on publicly
disclosed material.235 If so, the court then had to assess whether
the relator was an original source of the disclosure.236 In order to
establish subject matter jurisdiction, the qui tam plaintiff had to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the suit was not
based upon a prior public disclosure, or, if it was, that he or she
was an original source of the information.237 The FCA outlined
three ways in which prior public disclosure could occur: (1) in a
civil, criminal, or administrative hearing;238 (2) in a Congressional, administrative, or GAO report, audit, or investigation;239

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (amending various sections of the U.S. Code including the
FCA and Anti-Kickback Statute).
232 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
233 United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d
645, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
234 Id. at 651.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 653.
237 United States v. Alcan Elec. & Eng’g, Inc., 197 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th
Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. Biddle v. Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ., 161 F.3d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1998).
238 “Hearing” encompassed both civil complaints and criminal indictments.
United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1350 (4th
Cir. 1994). With regard to administrative hearings, the issue of what constituted a
“hearing” and thus a “public disclosure” was not so cut and dry. See, e.g., A-1
Ambulance Serv. Inc. v. California, 202 F.3d 1238, 1244 (9th Cir. 2000); United
States ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 21 F. Supp. 2d 607, 614–15
(E.D. La. 1998).
239 In United States ex rel. Schwedt v. Planning Research Corp., 39 F.
Supp. 2d 28, 31–32, 34 (D.D.C. 1999), an audit report prepared by the Office
of Inspector General and reviewed by an outside accounting firm indicated
231
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or (3) in the media.240 Generally, the courts broadly construed
what types of disclosures were public and thus barred qui tam
suits,241 even though some disputes existed among the courts.242
In the ACA, Congress lowered the disclosure bar so that
only facts that are “substantially the same” as the facts disclosed
in the prior proceeding would lead to the bar being imposed.243
The bar now applies if the information on which the qui tam suit
is based has been disclosed in a federal proceeding in which the
government is a participant.244 The public disclosure bar does not
apply when the qui tam plaintiff is an “original source” of the
information’s provenance.245 Before the ACA, the public disclosure bar prevented many qui tam claims that involved public
information, as broadly construed.246 This change to the FCA has
enhanced its potency as a weapon against healthcare fraud.247
C.Federal Anti-Kickback Statute
The federal Anti-Kickback Statute248 is a criminal statute
that prohibits knowingly and willfully paying or receiving any
compensation, directly or indirectly, in cash or in kind, in exchange
for prescribing, purchasing, or recommending any service, treatment, or item for which payment will be made by Medicaid,
Medicare, or any other federally funded program.249 The antikickback statute is broadly drafted and establishes liability for

that a government contractor had submitted flawed products while certifying
their completeness. The district court held that a qui tam suit was based upon a
public disclosure and was thus barred.
240 United States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149,
1149 (3d Cir. 1991) (construing the term “hearing” to incorporate more than
just formal proceedings; it includes any information disclosed in connection
with criminal, civil, or administrative litigation).
241 See Springfield Term. Ry. Co., 14 F.3d at 654.
242 Phelps, supra note 140, at 260.
243 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
244 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(iii); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
245 Id.; J. Hammond, What Exactly Is Healthcare Fraud After the Affordable Care Act?, 42 STETSON L. REV. 35, 53 (2012).
246 Hammond, supra note 245, at 53.
247 See id.
248 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b) (2017).
249 D. Rheiner, Kickbacks and Contradictions: The Anti-Kickback Statute
and Electronic Health Records, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 493, 500 (2015).
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individuals and entities on not only kickbacks and bribes, but
also an array of economic relationships that can be more complex
than a simple payment for services.250 The purpose of the antikickback statute is to prevent drains on the public treasury.251
In 1985, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals significantly
expanded the scope of the anti-kickback statute in U.S. v. Greber.252
The court established the “One Purpose Test,” holding that if one
purpose of a payment was to induce future referrals, the arrangement violated the anti-kickback statute.253 Although the
anti-kickback statute does not afford a private right of action,
the FCA254 provides a vehicle whereby individuals may bring qui
tam actions255 alleging violations of the anti-kickback law. For a
conviction under the anti-kickback statute, the government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: (1)
knowingly and willfully; (2) solicited, received, paid, or offered to
pay remuneration; (3) in return for, or to induce, a referral or
generation of program-related business.256 The “knowing and willful” element is met by demonstrating the defendant was aware
his conduct was unlawful and acted voluntarily and purposely.257
Further clarification of the first element was provided in U.S. v.

F.T. Pyle III, Comment, The Federal Anti-Kickback Statute Has No Preemptive Power, or Does It? Florida’s Supreme Court Holds Florida’s Medicaid
Anti-Kickback Statute Unconstitutional, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 631, 636 (2007).
251 United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., 874 F.2d
20, 32 (1st Cir. 1989).
252 See United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 71 (3d Cir. 1985).
253 Id. at 69.
254 See generally 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012).
255 A qui tam plaintiff, also referred to as a qui tam relator, or a whistleblower, is a private citizen who files a civil lawsuit against an alleged fraudster
on behalf of himself and the U.S. government. If the government does not pursue
actions, the relator pursuing the case is entitled to “not less than 25 percent
and not more than 30 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement.” 31
U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2).
256 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b); United States v. Vernon, 723 F.3d 1234, 1251–52
(11th Cir. 2013).
257 Vernon, 723 F.3d at 1256 (“[T]his court concluded ... the word ‘willfully’
“means the act was committed voluntarily and purposely with the specific
intent to do something the law forbids, that is, with a bad purpose, either to
disobey or disregard the law.”). In 18 U.S.C. § 1347(b) (2012) it states “with
respect to violations of this section, a person need not have actual knowledge
of this section as specific intent to commit a violation of this section.”
250

514 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:479
Mathur,258 which states “with respect to violations of this section,
a person need not have “actual knowledge” of this section as “specific intent” to commit a violation of this section.259
The broad scope of the One Purpose Test has the potential
to create liability under the anti-kickback statute for actions
that are commonly accepted commercial arrangements.260 Parties can also be liable under the Anti-Kickback Statute even if
their actions cause no tangible harm to patients.261 For example,
if a hospital offers a physician any remuneration to join its staff,
intending that the doctor will refer Medicare patients to the
hospital, it risks violating the One Purpose Test.262
The broad scope of potential liability under the statute
gave rise to sufficient concern in Congress that numerous “safe
harbors” or statutory exceptions were created.263 The Office of
Inspector General (OIG) has listed over twenty-five regulatory
safe harbor provisions and one statutory provision264 that protect physicians from liability under the Anti-Kickback Statute.
Each transaction or alleged activity that falls within a safe harbor
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to ascertain whether
it constitutes an anti-kickback violation.265
The following list is a partial enumeration of some of the
safe harbor provisions:

United States v. Mathur, 2012 WL 4742833, at *15 (D. Nev. Sept. 13,
2012) (“[T]he [Affordable Care Act] has not removed a specific intent requirement
from the Anti-Kickback Act ... the government must still show that a criminal
defendant acted ‘knowingly and willingly’ in offering or paying remunerations in
exchange for patient referrals. [The Act] simply clarified that the government
is not required to show a criminal defendant specifically knew the Anti-Kickback
Act prohibited offering or paying consideration to induce referrals and intended to
violate the law.”).
259 Id.
260 James G. Sheehan & Jesse A. Goldner, Beyond the Anti-Kickback Statute:
New Entities, New Theories in Healthcare Fraud Prosecutions, 40 J. HEALTH
L. 167, 171 (2007).
261 United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 442 (8th Cir. 1996).
262 Polk Cnty. v. Peters, 800 F. Supp. 1451, 1456 (E.D. Tex. 1992).
263 Safe harbors protect from prosecution-specific practices that would otherwise violate the Anti-Kickback Statute. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(e)(iv)(B)
(2017).
264 See generally 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a)–(y).
265 CRAIN ET AL., supra note 139, at 530.
258
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1. Investment safe harbor. This protects an investor
who holds a security issued by an entity, provided
he or she satisfies certain statutory requirements.
This safe harbor applies to three types of securities:
investments in large entities, in small entities, and
in medically underserved areas.266
2. Sale of physician practices. This is divided into two
sections: sales to another practitioner and sales to a
hospital or other entity. Each type of sale has different criteria.267
3. Practitioner recruitment safe harbor. This is designed
to allow areas that have difficulty attracting doctors
to offer incentives to potential practitioners. Various
conditions must be met.268
4. Space rental, equipment rental, and personal services
and management contracts. These safe harbors prevent prosecution of such contracts if payments
thereunder meet the following criteria: (1) the written contract covers all of the property or services
exchanged between the parties; (2) the contract is
in writing and is signed by all the parties; (3) the
schedule of use, length of each use, and exact rent
is set for those property or services that are used
only periodically; (4) the contract is for at least one
year; (5) the payments are equal to fair market
value and are set in advance; and (6) the space or
amount of services is no more than necessary for a
reasonable business purpose.269
5. Referral services safe harbor. This protects organizations that operate referral services for a fee, such
as professional societies or consumer groups. The
safe harbor does not extend to situations where the
operator of the referral service adjusts the fees that it
charges participating doctors based on the number

42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a) (2017).
Id. § 1001.952(e).
268 Id. § 1001.952(n).
269 Id. § 1001.952(c).
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of referrals the physician makes to the operator of
the service.270
6. Referral arrangements for specialty services. This
is designed to allow a practitioner to refer a patient to
another party for the provision of a specialty service
under an agreement that the patient will be referred
back at a specified time or under certain conditions.271
7. Ambulance replenishing. Under the law, “remuneration does not include any gift or transfer of drugs
or medical supplies (including linens) by a hospital
or other receiving facility to an ambulance provider
for the provider (or first responder) in connection
with the transport of a patient by ambulance to the
hospital or other receiving facility if all the criteria
in this safe harbor are met.272
Under the law, “remuneration” does not include the transfer of
any goods, items, services, donations, or loans (whether in cash
or in-kind), or combination therefrom from an individual or entity
to a health center, as long as nine specified standards are met.273
These regulatory safe harbors are drawn narrowly. “If an
agreement does not meet the exact requirements of a safe harbor
regulation, it is not immunized from liability under the AntiKickback Statute.”274 “[A]n agreement is subject to the One Purpose
Test if it does not fit precisely into a safe harbor, even if it is in substantial compliance with the requirements of the regulation.”275
Many arrangements will not fit into the specific requirements of
a certain specific harbor but the Department of Health and Human
Services “[(]HHS[)] has no motivation to challenge these agreements if they create no risk of tangible harm to patients or drain
on the public fisc”.276

Id. § 1001.952(f).
Id. § 1001.952(s).
272 Id. § 1001.952(v).
273 Id. § 1001.952(w).
274 Rheiner, supra note 249, at 505.
275 Id.
276 Id.
270
271
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D.False Statements to Obtain Health Benefits or Payments
A little-known federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a),
makes it a crime to make a false statement or representation in
any application or claim for benefits under a federal healthcare
program.277 Under this statute, the federal government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant made, or caused
to be made, a statement or representation of material fact in an
application for payment or benefits under a federal healthcare
program; (2) the statement or representation was false; and (3)
the defendant knowingly and willfully made the false statement
or representation.278
The first element requires that a statement or representation of fact be material to be actionable.279 Materiality is a mixed
question of law and fact.280 The customary common law test of
materiality in false statement laws is whether the statement
“has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing,
the decision of the decision-making body to which it was addressed.”281 The government does not have to prove actual reliance on the false statement by the respective federal agency.282
The second element of the offense requires the defendant
to utter or make a false statement or representation.283 The false
statement or representation must have been submitted to the

42 USC § 1320a-7b(a) (2018).
Id. United States v. Laughlin, 26 F.3d 1523, 1527 (10th Cir. 1994).
279 United States v. Njoku, 737 F.3d 55, 61–62 (5th Cir. 2013). In Njoku, a
company named Family Healthcare Group, Inc. did business in Houston, Texas.
The company was approved as a Medicare provider in 2005. Family Healthcare
provided home healthcare to individuals by skilled nurses. Family Health
Care was paid about $5.2 million for home healthcare services between April
2006 and August 2009. Evidence at trial showed that Family Healthcare billed
Medicare for services to beneficiaries who were ineligible for home healthcare, not
in need of skilled nursing, or received services that were inadequate and misrepresented in the documented nursing reports. Nursing notes were subject
to audit by Medicare. The jury found that the nursing notes were material.
Id. at 66–67.
280 United States v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943,944, 948 (9th Cir. 1994).
281 Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988).
282 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999); United States v. Rowe, 56
F. 2d 747, 749 (2d Cir. 1932).
283 Laughlin, 26 F.3d at 1526.
277
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respective federal agency for payment.284 Examples include: billing Medicaid for procedures not actually performed,285 submitting
claims for patients never examined,286 submitting claims for services not personally rendered,287 and submitting claims for services
rendered by another party.288
The third element of the offense is that the accused “knowingly and willfully” make or causes to be made any false representation.289 “Knowingly” refers to the fact that proof must exist
that the accused possessed knowledge of the facts that constitute
the offense.290 The “knowing[ ] and willful[ ]” element is satisfied if
the accused is aware his or her conduct is unlawful without any
knowledge of the specific statute violated.291 Moreover, the accused must know that the statement is false at the time it is made
or submitted.292
E.The Stark Law
In 1989, as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act, Congress enacted into law Stark I293 to counteract the growing
cost of healthcare attributable to physician self-referrals.294 Stark I


Id.
United States v. Boesen, 541 F.3d 838, 843 (8th Cir. 2008). In this case,
Dr. Boesen specialized in the medical and surgical treatment of the ears,
nose, and throat. Between 2000 and 2002, Boesen’s clinic was regularly billing federal healthcare agencies for nasal endoscopy with debridement, cholesteatoma removal, and otoacoustic emissions tests not actually done.
286 United States v. Larm, 824 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1987). In this case,
Dr. Peter Larm, an allergist, was convicted of Medicaid fraud for submitting
false claims for “office visits” where he neither saw or examined the patients
nor personally rendered the services.
287 Id. In Larm, the allergist also submitted claims for administration
charges for injections which the patients administered themselves. Id.
288 United States v. Davis, 471 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 2006). In this case,
Davis, a psychologist, billed Medicaid for psychological services provided by
employees in his employ who were not qualified to deliver them. Id.
289 Laughlin, 26 F.3d at 1526.
290 Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 184 (1998).
291 United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833, 837–38 (11th Cir. 1998) (alteration in quote).
292 United States v. Njoku, 737 F.3d 55, 66–67 (5th Cir. 2013).
293 See generally, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-239, § 6204 (codified, as amended, at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2018)).
294 W. Grioux, J. Maul, A. Delaplane, F. Hane, D. Josephy, N. Pfeiffer & P.
Safirstein, Health Care Fraud, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1333 (2018).
284
285
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prohibited physician referrals under Medicare for clinical lab
services when the referring physician has a financial relationship with the lab unless the terms of certain statutory or regulatory exceptions are met.295 As part of the Omnibus Budget and
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Stark I was expanded into Stark II.296
Stark II extended the Stark I legislation to Medicaid patients
and to “designated health services” (DHS) other than clinical
laboratory services.297
In general, the Stark Law (I and II collectively) and its
accompanying regulations prohibit a physician (or an immediate
family member) who has a “financial relationship” with a medical
facility (e.g., a hospital) from making a “referral” to that facility for
the furnishing of certain DHS for which payment can be made
by the federal government.298 A medical facility may not submit
for payment a Medicare or Medicaid claim for service provided
pursuant to a forbidden referral.299 The federal government may
not make payments pursuant to a prohibited claim and medical
facilities must reimburse any payments that are mistakenly made
by the federal government.300
The Stark Law took years to take effect: Stark I did not go
into force until January 1, 1992.301 Enforcement of Stark II took
effect on January 1, 1995.302 The final regulations of Stark II became effective on January 4, 2002.303 Phase III regulations were
published in September 2007, and the enhanced clarity of said
regulations reduced the regulatory burden on the healthcare
industry.304 The Stark law is complex, but its violation can carry
severe penalties.305


42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1)(A) (1992).
P. BUCY ET AL., HEALTH CARE FRAUD: ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE,
4.05 [1] and [6] (9th ed. 2002) (citing Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66).
297 Id.
298 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1)(A) (2018); United States ex rel. Drakeford v.
Tuomey Healthcare Sys., Inc., 675 F.3d 394, 397–98 (4th Cir. 2012).
299 Drakeford, 675 F.3d at 397–98.
300 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(1) (2018).
301 BUCY ET AL., supra note 296, at 2–129 n.182.
302 Id. at 4–89.
303 Id.
304 Patrick A. Sutton, The Stark Law in Retrospect, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L.
15, 25 (2011).
305 Id. at 34.
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Determination of whether a Stark law violation has occurred entails a multistep analysis. The first step is to ascertain
whether the person or entity involved has made a “referral.” The
latter is “the request by a physician for, or ordering of, or the
certifying or recertifying of the need for,” as well as the establishment of a plan of care by a physician that includes the provision of a DHS for which payment may be made under Medicare
or Medicaid.306 While the Stark regulations do not expressly
include any DHS provided by the referring physician, they do
implicate referrals made within a physician’s group practice.307
The second step in the analysis is defining “physician.” A
“physician” means a doctor of medicine or osteopathy, a doctor of
dental surgery or dental medicine, a doctor of podiatric medicine, a
doctor of optometry, or a chiropractor.308 Nurse practitioners,
physician’s assistants, and physical therapists do not fall within
the definition.309 Another step in the analysis is specifying DHS.
The latter includes the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Clinical laboratory services.
Physical therapy services.
Occupational therapy services.
Radiology services, including magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI), computerized axial tomography
scans, and ultrasound services.
5. Radiation therapy services and supplies.
6. Durable medical equipment and supplies.
7. Parental and enteral nutrients, equipment, and
supplies.
8. Prosthetics, orthotics, and prosthetic devices and
supplies.
9. Home health services.
10. Outpatient prescription drugs.
11. Inpatient and outpatient hospital services.310
One of the most significant determinations under the Stark
law is whether a “financial relationship” exists between a physician

42 C.F.R. § 411.351 (2018).
Id.
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(6) (2018).
306
307
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(or an immediate family member) and the entity to which the referral has been made. A “financial relationship” can fall into one
or more of three categories: (1) an ownership interest; (2) an investment interest; or (3) a compensation arrangement between
the physician (or immediate family member) and the entity.311
Stark regulations specify that a financial relationship may be
“direct” or “indirect.”312 A “direct” financial relationship exists “if
remuneration passes between the referring physician (or a
member of his or her immediate family) and the entity furnishing DHS without any intervening persons or entities ....”313 An
“indirect financial relationship” is present when three criteria
are met.314 First, an unbroken chain of persons or entities must
exist between the referring physician and the entity rendering
DHS.315 Next, the referring physician must receive aggregate
compensation that takes into consideration the volume or value
of referrals or other business generated by the referring physician for the receiving entity.316 Third, the entity providing DHS
must have actual knowledge (or act in reckless disregard or in
deliberate ignorance of) the fact that the referring physician (or
immediate family member) receives aggregate compensation
that takes into account the volume or value of referrals.317 Some
exceptions apply to the financial relationship prohibition.318
The last step is to consider the meaning of the word “entity”
on the receiving end of a referral. “Entity” means “[a] physician’s
sole practice or a practice of multiple physicians or any other person, sole proprietorship, public or private agency or trust, corporation ... that furnishes DHS. An entity does not include the

Id. § 1395nn(a)(2).
42 C.F.R. § 411.354(a)(1)–(2) (2018).
313 Id. § 411.354(a)(2).
314 Id. §§ 411.354(b)–(c).
315 Id. §§ 411.354 (b)(5)(i), (c)(2)(i).
316 Id. § 411.354(c)(2)(ii).
317 Id. § 411.354(c)(2)(iii).
318 Exceptions to the Stark law “financial relationship” element fall into
three general categories: 1) all-purpose ownership and compensation arrangements; 2) ownership and investment exceptions; and 3) direct and indirect
compensation arrangement exceptions. The latter categories are the target for
critics of the statute’s complexity and focus of the statute itself. Paula Tironi,
The “Stark” Reality: Is the Federal Physician Self-Referral Law Bad for the
Health Care Industry?, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 235, 238 (2010).
311
312
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referring physician ... but does include his or her medical practice.”319 This definition means that physicians or physician group
practices that perform DHS must now meet an exception to the
Stark law.320
In cases where a physician has made a referral for DHS to
an entity with which he or she has a financial relationship, the
next question is whether an exception to the law applies. Exceptions fall into three categories: (1) exceptions applicable to both
physician ownership/investment interests and compensation
arrangements; (2) exceptions for ownership or investment interests
only; and (3) exceptions for compensation arrangements only.321
The first exceptions category includes doctors’ “services
where referrals are between members of the same group practice,322 certain ancillary services rendered within the same office
of a group practice [(this is the most commonly used exception)],323
and certain prepaid health plans.”324 The second exceptions category includes ownership interests in publicly traded securities,
healthcare facilities in rural areas or Puerto Rico, and hospitals
meeting certain requirements.325 The third exceptions category
covers the rental of office space and equipment, genuine employment relationships, personal services arrangements, physician
recruitment activities, and payments by doctors for certain items
and services.326
The federal regulations that relate to these exceptions are
complex and require intensive analysis. Some of the matters which
must be scrutinized include, for example, whether doctors in a
group practice spend the required number of hours with patients
per week providing non-DHS services,327 and whether the amount
of space leased exceeds the amount deemed “reasonable and
necessary” for legitimate business purposes.328

42 C.F.R. § 411.351 (2018) (alteration in quotation).
Sutton, supra note 304, at 27–28; Grioux et al., supra note 294, at 1368.
321 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(b)–(e) (2010).
322 Sutton, supra note 304, at 30 (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(1) (2010)).
323 Id.
324 Id.
325 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(c)–(d) (2010).
326 Id. §§ 1395nn(e)(1)–(8).
327 Id. § 411.355(b)(2)(A)(2) (2009).
328 Sutton, supra note 304, at 30 (referencing 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(a)(3) (2009)).
319
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Penalties for violations of the Stark law can be severe.
Claims filed for services in violation of self-referrals mean nonpayment.329 Moreover, if one collects money in violation of the
Stark law, the money must be refunded.330 Improper claims may
result in civil monetary penalties up to $15,000 per violation and
exclusion from participating in Medicaid and Medicare programs.331 Also, a civil penalty not to exceed $100,000 applies to
cross-referral arrangements when a physician or entity “knows
or should know” that the arrangement serves to assure referrals
by the physician to the entity.332
In February 2018, the Bipartisan Budget Act outlined
changes to the Stark law.333 Holdovers in personal services arrangement exceptions and equipment exceptions are now indefinite; previously they had been limited to six months.334
F.Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
In 1996, Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA),335 which expanded the fight
against healthcare fraud in numerous ways. First, HIPAA expanded the coverage of the Anti-Kickback Statute to include all
federal healthcare programs.336 Next, HIPAA widened the definition of a kickback.337 Controversy existed at one time as to
whether waiving a copayment or deductible constituted remuneration to induce patients to utilize a given provider.338 Section
231 of HIPAA specifically states that waiving a copayment is a


42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(1) (2010).
Id. § 1395nn(g)(2).
331 Id. § 1395nn(g)(3).
332 Id. § 1395nn(g)(4).
333 See Kristina Sherry et al., 2018 Changes to the Federal Physician SelfReferral Law, NELSON HARDIMAN NEWSROOM (March 20, 2018), https://www.nel
sonhardiman.com [https://perma.cc/B2VJ-5QH].
334 Id.
335 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7c).
336 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–b applies to anything “under a federal health care
program.”
337 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(7).
338 A. Craig Eddy, The Effect of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) on Health Care Fraud in Montana, 61 MONT. L.
REV. 175, 199 (2000).
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kickback unless it is done for a documented financial need or
represents failure to collect after reasonable efforts.339 HIPAA
also extends this to all federal healthcare programs except the
Federal Employee Health Benefit Program.340 Under HIPAA
and the Anti-Kickback Statute, remuneration includes the routine
or partial waiver of coinsurance and deductibles as well as the
transfer of items or services for free or less than market value.341
There is a safe harbor for waivers not routinely offered.342
HIPAA also changed the money laundering, asset forfeiture and injunctive relief statutes to cover “federal health care
offenses.”343 Significantly, HIPAA amended a federal criminal
forfeiture statute with a new section containing mandatory forfeiture language that states a court “shall order the person [convicted of a federal health care offense] to forfeit property, real or
personal, that constitutes or is derived, directly or indirectly,
from gross proceeds traceable to the commission of the offense.”344
The use of criminal forfeiture represents a step forward in
healthcare fraud cases, but civil forfeiture would provide federal
law enforcement authorities the power to seize the assets or
funds of healthcare fraudsters sooner, reducing the chance that
assets or funds could be dissipated or moved. HIPAA also widened
the fraud injunction statute, authorizing the federal government
to commence a civil lawsuit to enjoin the commission of a federal
healthcare offense and to freeze the assets of fraudsters disposing or trying to dispose of assets acquired as a result.345
In United States v. Sriram, the federal government filed
suit against Dr. Krishnaswami Sriram for fraudulently acquiring over $1 million in false Medicare claims.346 Besides asserting
claims for civil penalties and treble damages under the FCA, the

42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7a(i)(6) (2018).
Id. § 1320a-7b(f). The expressed definition includes “any plan or program
that provides health benefits, whether directly, through insurance, or otherwise,
which is funded directly, in whole or in part, by the United States Government
(other than the health insurance program under chapter 89 ....).” Id.
341 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(6) (2018).
342 Id.
343 Eddy, supra note 338, at 198.
344 Id. (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(7) (2018)).
345 18 U.S.C. § 1345 (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(7) (2018).
346 United States v. Sriram, 147 F. Supp. 2d 914, 916 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
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government sought and obtained a preliminary injunction against
Sriram and froze certain assets (over $1.6 million).347
HIPAA has also had other significant effects in the fight
against healthcare fraud. HIPAA is the first federal statute that creates a federal crime of healthcare fraud committed against private
healthcare plans.348 HIPAA also created five new healthcarerelated crimes, four of which were felonies and one a misdemeanor.349 The new crimes created are: (1) healthcare fraud;350
(2) theft or embezzlement in connection with healthcare;351 (3) false
statements relating to healthcare matters;352 and (4) obstruction of


Id. at 949.
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 241–247, 249, 110 Stat. 1936 (1997) (codified at 18
U.S.C.A. § 24).
349 Grioux et al., supra note 294, at 1372.
350 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2018). For conviction, this statute requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 1) knowingly
and willfully executed or attempted to execute, a scheme or artifice to 2) defraud a healthcare benefit program or to obtain by false or fraudulent pretenses any money or property under the custody or control of a healthcare
benefit program and 3) in connection with the delivery of or payment for
healthcare benefits, items, or services. Examples include United States v.
Morgan, 505 F.3d 332, 335 (5th Cir. 2007) (defendant convicted of twelve
counts of healthcare fraud to defraud Medicare by signing a Certificate of
Medical Necessity (CMN) for motorized wheelchairs for patients that the defendant did not examine and who were not medically eligible for wheelchairs);
United States v. Hunt, 521 F.3d 636, 640 (6th Cir. 2008) (conviction for
healthcare fraud where the doctor submitted claims to Medicare for tests that
had not been determined to be medically necessary since the defendant had
not examined the patients); United States v. Gelin, 712 F.3d 612, 614 (1st
Cir. 2013) (two defendants convicted of violating § 1347 from making false claims
to and obtaining payment from, insurers participating in Massachusetts’ nofault auto insurance program. Congress did not limit the scope of § 1347 to
health insurers).
351 18 U.S.C. § 669 (2018). For a conviction under this section, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and
willingly embezzled, stole, intentionally misapplied, or otherwise converted any of
the property or assets of a healthcare program. This statute allows federal prosecutions of embezzlements from private health plans. United States v. Lucien,
347 F.3d 45, 51–52 (2d Cir. 2003).
352 18 U.S.C. § 1035 (2018). To convict a person of making false statements
relating to healthcare matters, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 1) person knowingly and willingly made false statements
or representations 2) in connection with the delivery of or payment for healthcare benefits, items, or services and 3) in a matter involving a healthcare benefit program. United States v. Hunt, 521 F.3d 636, 647–48 (6th Cir. 2008).
347
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criminal healthcare investigations.353 The penalties include a
maximum prison term of five to ten years.354
CONCLUSION
Despite increasing efforts by the U.S. government, law enforcement agencies, and federal and private health insurance programs, healthcare fraud remains a widespread problem. Countless
individual victims have had to deal with the consequences, such
as false information added to their medical records, damaged credit
ratings, and unnecessary medical bills. Moreover, Medicare,
Medicaid and other federal healthcare programs have been and
continue to be hit by tens of billions of dollars in fraudulent claims.
Fraud schemes committed by healthcare providers, organized
crime, and others cost more than just money; these frauds shake
the public’s trust in a system that should engender confidence.
Society and the federal government are not without powerful statutory weapons to fight healthcare fraud. This Article
analyzes the major federal civil and criminal laws relied on to
combat healthcare fraud, including the Federal False Claims Act
(FCA), the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)
of 2010, the Stark Law, a law against false statements to obtain
health benefits or payments, the federal Anti-Kickback Statute,
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),
and the mail and wire fraud statutes.
The FCA is a civil law but represents the single most potent federal law available to combat healthcare fraud. One factor
that makes the FCA so powerful is the qui tam legal action in
which a private citizen can obtain a monetary reward of fifteen
to thirty percent of any settlement or verdict in a healthcare
fraud case committed against the United States.355 The PPACA
loosened the public disclosure bar formerly faced by qui tam

18 U.S.C. § 1518a (2018). A conviction requires that the government prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant willfully prevented, obstructed,
misled, delayed or attempted to prevent, obstruct, mislead, or delay the communication of information or records relating to a violation of a federal healthcare offense to a criminal investigator. See United States v. Franklin-El, 554
F.3d 903, 909 (10th Cir. 2009).
354 Eddy, supra note 338, at 197.
355 See supra Section II.A.
353
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plaintiffs.356 This PPACA feature has enhanced the FCA as a
weapon to combat healthcare fraud. The Stark Law is a federal civil
law aimed at preventing and deterring physician self-referrals
for certain designated health services.357
A less well-known federal statute makes it a crime to make
a false statement or representation in any claim for benefits
under a federal healthcare program. The federal Anti-Kickback
Statute is a criminal law that prohibits paying or receiving anything of value in exchange for prescribing, purchasing, or recommending any medical treatment or item paid for with federal
money.358 HIPAA established several new federal healthcare
fraud crimes, including private insurance plan healthcare fraud,
healthcare embezzlement, false statements relating to healthcare, and obstruction of criminal health investigations.359 Federal
mail and wire fraud statutes have also been utilized to prosecute
healthcare fraudsters.
The fight against healthcare fraud is important for American society. Every dollar saved or recovered from fraud can be
used to ensure people have access to better healthcare services.
Significant fines and damages have been collected and more prison
sentences meted out in recent years for healthcare fraud offenses.
The most current report from the DOJ states that, during fiscal
year 2014, the Federal government won or negotiated over $2.3
billion in healthcare fraud settlements and judgments.360 Also in
fiscal year 2014, 734 defendants were convicted of healthcare
fraud-related crimes, 782 new civil healthcare fraud investigations were opened, and 957 healthcare fraud matters were pending.361 Despite these recent successes, the battle must continue
until healthcare fraud is a vanishingly rare occurrence.


Id.
See supra Section II.E.
358 See supra Section II.C.
359 See supra Section II.F.
360 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM FY 2014 1 (2015).
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